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PRIVATE ORDERING AND PUBLIC ENERGY
INNOVATION POLICY
DANIEL R. CAHOY* & LELAND GLENNA**
ABSTRACT
Nascent development in alternative energy technologies can be
greatly affected by intellectual property environments. Tight control
over foundational patent rights by a few companies can hold up commercialization. Conversely, widely dispersed ownership can create
thickets that discourage innovation investment ex ante. Given the
high-technology nature of the most promising alternative energy proposals, such intellectual property impacts are of great concern. This
Article considers the issue in the specific context of the most widely
used alternative fuel source—ethanol-based biofuels. It finds that the
ownership environment is quite diverse and theoretically ripe for a socalled anticommons effect. However, using analogies to general agricultural biotechnology, this Article demonstrates that the biofuel patent environment is likely to undergo a striking transformation
through the effects of private ordering. It articulates a general model
of ordering behavior and suggests the most important conditions that
facilitate ordering in particular industries. This Article concludes
that market-based reordering of patent ownership, although not without negatives, may promote efficient commercialization and blunt the
need for government intervention in certain alternative energies. It
should be factored into any rational public energy policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the global community has expressed increasing
concern regarding the availability of future energy supplies. If oil
production peaks in the near future, as some suggest,1 subsequent
supply will fail to meet demand. The emergence of China and India
as major consumers places even greater constraints on energy markets.2 To be sure, the current economic downturn has temporarily relieved some of the pressure,3 but energy-producing states have been
laboring to support prices,4 and the failure to pursue expanded production may lead to a severe shortage when the economy recovers.5
In addition to supply issues, current energy sources produce significant levels of greenhouse gases that are now widely believed to be
contributing to a global warming trend.6 Moreover, many energy re1. The notion of peak oil was discussed extensively in a 2005 report sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Energy. ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., PEAKING OF WORLD OIL
PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT (2005). Predictions of when it
will occur differ significantly. Id. at 17-19. U.S. oil production peaked some time ago in the
early 1970s. Id. at 16.
2. Id. at 55. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS (2007).
3. See IEA, OIL MARKET REPORT 4 (2009) [hereinafter IEA-OMR] (forecasting that as
a result of the economic crisis and conservation in response to high prices in the summer of
2008, world oil use will fall for the first time since the early 1980s).
4. See Brian Baskin, Oil Ends at $45.38, a Five-Week High, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2009, at C12 (“The draw indicates that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
has met with some success in reducing production to match demand weakened by the global economic downturn.”); Spencer Swartz & Neil King, Jr., OPEC Cuts 1.5 Million Barrels
from Daily Output; Cartel’s Move to Slash 2% of World Demand Lacks Immediate Impact;
Oil Price Drops to Lowest Level Since May 2007, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at A6 (describing the oil producing cartel’s attempt to shore up prices in the midst of economic decline).
5. According to the IEA, curbed investment and inadequate new supply in the face of
a global recovery “could sow the seed of a sudden reversion to much higher prices, and further intense price volatility, . . . with all the adverse impacts on economic growth that this
would imply.” IEA-OMR, supra note 3, at 24.
6. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36-41 (2007).
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sources, particularly oil, are in the hands of unstable governments
that appear to pose an ever greater threat to international security
as their pockets are lined with energy profits.7 Though people may
reasonably disagree as to the level of danger posed by any one of
these issues, it is fair to say that a cumulative pressure has pushed
the global consciousness toward the investigation of alternative
fuel sources.
At a glance, biofuels appear to neatly address many of the problems in current energy supplies. They are a source of energy that can
be produced in large quantities by any country with advanced agricultural technologies and resources,8 may be more environmentally
friendly than fossil fuels,9 and could serve as a rural development
tool to boot.10 However, in its current form, biofuel production has
produced significant externalities, causing policymakers to look toward the high-tech future of so-called second generation or cellulosic
biofuels.11 In this emerging environment, intellectual property—
particularly patents—can be expected to play a significant role. If intellectual property rights provide the expected research and development incentives, the future of biofuel innovation and global energy
supplies should be bright.
Unfortunately, there is a cloud on the horizon. In developing industries where dominant players have yet to emerge, overlapping patents may be spread among many competitors, forming a thicket of
rights. Second generation biofuels could comport with this model.
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg pointed out several years ago
that such an overabundance of rights could act as an anticommons—
a state in which no one can commercialize due to the veto power of

7. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S.
OIL DEPENDENCY 22-23 (2006).
8. Stephan Herrera, Bonkers About Biofuels, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 755,
755 (2006).
9. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006, at 391-93 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ENERGY
OUTLOOK] (discussing the possible positive environmental impact of biofuels but noting
that several factors may change this).
10. See, e.g., STEVEN E. SEXTON & DAVID ZILBERMAN, BIOFUEL IMPACTS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE,
THE
ENVIRONMENT
AND
FOOD
17-18
(2008),
available
at
http://www.energybiosciencesinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_down
load&gid=13; Ofir D. Rubin et al., Implied Objectives of U.S. Biofuels Subsidies 10-17 (Ctr.
for Agric. and Rural Dev. at Iowa State Univ., Working Paper 08-WP 459, 2008), available
at http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/08wp459.pdf (discussing the
impact of biofuels on job creation and commodity prices). A viable, long-term industry can
funnel profits into small businesses (as well as large agribusinesses). The recent rise in
commodity prices has seen the revival of small towns across the Midwest. See Jason Beaubien, Morning Edition: Ethanol Demand, Prices Boost Farm Communities (transcript of
NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=87782087.
11. See, e.g., Mark Svenvold, The Biofuel Race, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/09_7_biofuel.html.
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any individual’s overlapping patent.12 Theoretically, an anticommons
can slow or completely stall innovation. If this occurs, the hope
placed on biofuel energy may be effectively dashed.
This Article considers the issue of patent barriers in alternative
energy research and provides new optimism by highlighting an oftenoverlooked countering effect: private ordering. The ability of firms in
some technologies to consolidate patent rights through sales and licensing can significantly reduce holdups, preserving the pace of innovation. To explore the private ordering phenomenon, this Article
first provides context in Part II by articulating the connection between patents and emerging technologies. The problem of building
block patents as well as patent thickets is addressed. Next, in Part
III, the Article describes the effect of private ordering, drawing an
analogy to agricultural biotechnology. Positive mechanisms of private
ordering behaviors are provided and the necessary conditions for ordering are described. Finally, in Part IV, the Article provides an outline for integrating the reality of private ordering into energy policy.
It suggests tools for avoiding market failures with information rather
than regulation, but it also cautions as to the broader social implications of consolidation, which may be quite negative. The road to
energy security is littered with ill-considered policy choices, the Article concludes, but the situation is now much more critical. Failing
to consider the behavior of the private market would be a serious
misstep in the search for a solution so desperately needed.
II. PATENT CHAOS AND ENERGY INNOVATION
The recent emphasis on alternative energy sources has brought
biofuels like ethanol to the forefront of the debate. Despite their rather low-tech heritage, future biofuel sources are grounded in cutting-edge research. The positive impact of private patent rights on
innovation in research-intensive fields is an essential presumption of
the intellectual property system. But the reality is that patent rights
can serve as innovation barriers in some instances. Nascent fields
like second-generation biofuels may be especially susceptible. In view
of these concerns, it would be logical to conclude that government intervention is necessary to preserve optimal levels of invention
and commercialization.
A. From the Farm to the Lab: Biofuel’s Future in High Technology
Biofuel is often discussed as a future, exotic fuel source in the
United States, but it has actually been in wide use for many years
12. Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998).

2009]

PRIVATE ORDERING

419

and is the leading source of renewable energy.13 In fact, the United
States is a world leader in biofuel production.14 The most basic and
commonly used biofuel is ethanol.15 Ethanol is derived primarily from
farmed feedstocks (as opposed to lab-grown cell cultures) and can
power just about any type of mechanical device, provide heat, and
supply electricity. Interestingly, the technology for producing large
quantities of ethanol from feedstocks like corn and sugar cane16 is not
dramatically different from the methods that have been used for
thousands of years to produce alcoholic beverages.17 It is generally
viewed in the short term as a replacement for fossil-based automobile
fuels like gasoline and diesel,18 but it may have additional long-term
uses. Another common biofuel is “biodiesel,” a high-energy oil product that can be derived from biomass waste products or even used
food oil.19 Because it requires a significant conversion of existing automobile engine technology for use in gasoline-powered engines, it
has not received as much attention and constitutes only about ten
percent of the world’s biofuel production.20
However, existing biofuel technology has important limitations
that make it far less viable as future fuel source, at least in its
present form. One limitation is the amount of greenhouse gasses released by the production of bioethanol from corn. When the fuel for
farm machinery and electricity for production facilities (both of which

13. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), biomass constituted fifty-three percent of the energy consumption from renewable sources, edging out
hydroelectric at thirty-six percent. EIA, RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS IN CONSUMPTION
AND ELECTRICITY 2007, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
solar.renewables/page/trends/trends.pdf.
14. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 387 (noting that the United States was
predicted to overtake Brazil in biofuel production by 2006).
15. Daniel M. Kammen et al., Energy and Greenhouse Impacts of Biofuels: A Framework for Analysis, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), BIOFUELS—LINKING SUPPORT TO PERFORMANCE 41, 45 (2008).
16. Practically any sugar or starch containing biomass can be readily employed to
make ethanol, and different countries rely on a variety of different crops. For example,
Brazil has for years employed a wildly successful program to convert sugar cane into ethanol. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 387. The country even exports surplus ethanol derived from this high-energy source. Id. at 397.
17. After the biomass is collected, it is fermented until the sugar converts to ethanol.
Id. at 388. That ethanol is then distilled to a more pure form. Id. While the machinery has
certainly moved into the industrial age—with gigantic bioreactors and fermentors that can
produce millions of gallons in a single batch—the technology has more in common with a
medieval brewery than modern biotechnology techniques. See Richard Doornbosch & Ronald Steenblik, Biofuels: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, OECD Pub. No.
SG/SD/RT(2007)3, at 10 (2007) (“Ethyl alcohol, or ethanol, can be produced from any feedstock that contains relatively dense quantities of sugar or starchy crops, using nothing more
than a flask.”); see also Kammen et al., supra note 15, at 46 (“[C]urrent biofuel production
processes are many years old.”).
18. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 386-87.
19. Id. at 387.
20. Id.
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are almost always derived from fossil sources) is taken into account,
the advantage of biofuels compared to oil is less clear.21 Some argue
that, depending on the processing and the particular biofuel feedstock used, the total amount of greenhouse gasses produced actually
represents a net increase over fossil fuels.22 This has obvious implications for the global warming rationale for switching to biofuels. Perhaps a greater problem is posed by the current dependence on foodrelated crops to produce bioethanol.23 For example, in the United
States, corn is by far the most common source of bioethanol. Although humans do not directly ingest the corn used for biofuel production, it is used for farm animal feed.24 Additionally, it takes up a
great deal of land that could otherwise be used for human food crops,
with more land being converted to biofuel production each year.25
This dependence on food crops has led to the suggestion that biofuel
production is increasing the price and scarcity of world food sources.26
In view of these issues, the wave of criticism against current biofuel
sources has risen dramatically and quickly, dampening their prospects for the future.
In response, biofuel proponents point to its high-technology future, which could resolve a number of the current problems.27 These
technologies are often termed “second generation” biofuels.28 Most
plant matter, even in conventional biofuel feedstocks, is unsuitable
21. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 17-18 (describing greenhouse
gas emissions).
22. Id. at 17 (“In some cases, emissions may be as high or higher than the net GHG
emissions from gasoline vehicles.”); SEXTON & ZILBERMAN, supra note 10, at 9-10.
23. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 33-34; John Carey et al., Food vs. Fuel,
BUS. WK., Feb. 5, 2007, at 80 (“The roughly 5 billion gallons of ethanol made in 2006 by
112 U.S. plants consumed nearly one-fifth of the corn crop. If all the scores of factories under construction or planned go into operation, fuel will gobble up no less than half of the
entire corn harvest by 2008.”).
24. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 33.
25. Id. at 33-34.
26. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS [OECD-FAO], AGRICULTURAL
OUTLOOK 2008-2017, at 17, 30 (2008) (“[T]he energy security, environmental, and economic
benefits of biofuels production based on agricultural commodity feed stocks are at best
modest, and sometimes even negative . . . .”); SEXTON & ZILBERMAN, supra note 10, at 1417. According to the USDA, biofuel production has contributed ten percent of the overall
increase in food prices in the last year. Lauren Etter, Probe Sought of Bush Aides’ Biofuel
Statistics, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2008, at A2. Some suggest that it may be significantly
more when the impact on crops other than corn is taken into account. See Andrew Martin,
The Man Who Dared to Question Ethanol, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at BU.5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/business/13feed.html (discussing the research of former USDA economist Keith Collins).
27. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 5. But see Elisabeth Rosenthal, New
Trend in Biofuels Has New Risks, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2008, at A6 (stating that some
scientists are warning that second generation biofuels may pose problems because the
feedstocks are often invasive species).
28. See, e.g., Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 5.
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for current bioethanol production methods because it consists primarily of woody “cellulose” as opposed to sugar or starch.29 However,
it is possible to convert cellulose to either sugar or starch using enzymes or other biotechnology mechanisms.30 Such conversion opens
up an almost limitless supply of biofuel feedstocks from sources that
have no relation to the food supply. For example, switchgrass, jatropha, and poplar are prominently mentioned cellulosic feedstocks.31
Cellulosic waste products from food crops, such as corn stover,32 could
also be converted to ethanol. In addition to a greater variety of biofuel sources, cellulosic feedstocks can be grown on land that is not
important for food production.33 For many, including former President George W. Bush34 and President Barak Obama, the call is clear
to “generate more cellulosic ethanol from agricultural products like
corn stocks, switch grass and other crops our farmers grow.”35
In spite of its clear advantages, cellulosic ethanol is not commercially viable at this time. The expense of converting cellulose to
starch or sugar exceeds the energy benefits.36 Therefore, there is an
intense research effort into improving second-generation biofuels. It
is generally perceived that a “breakthrough” is required to make cellulosic ethanol a viable option in the future. This breakthrough will
likely occur in one of three areas: (1) improved feedstocks, which may
include genetically modified plants that provide greater energy
stores or resist attack by insect or herbicide; (2) more effective or less
expensive enzymes for breaking down cellulose into compounds that
can be converted to ethanol; and (3) improved “ethanologens,” which
are microorganisms that convert substrates into ethanol or other

29. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2006, at 277
(2006) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES 2006].
30. Id. at 277-79; EIA, Biofuels in the U.S. Transportation Sector (Feb. 2007),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/biomass.html [hereinafter EIA, Biofuels].
31. See Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 11; PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note
29, at 278 (“Fast-growing crops rich in cellulosic components, such as poplar trees and
switchgrass, are well suited to produce ethanol.”).
32. PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29, at 277.
33. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 14.
34. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush
Participates in Panel on Cellulosic Ethanol (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070222-5.html.
35. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Governor’s Ethanol Coalition, Energy Security Is
National Security (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.barackobama.com/2006/02/
28/energy_security_is_national_se.php; see also President Barack Obama Holds a News
Conference with Regional Reporters, POL. TRANSCRIPT WIRE, Mar. 13, 2009 (“I’ve also said .
. . that we’ve got to do a much better job of developing cellulosic ethanol, that corn-based
ethanol, over time, is not going to provide us with the energy-efficient solutions that
are needed.”).
36. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 11; PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29,
at 278-79 (“Significant technological challenges exist for the production of ethanol from
woody feedstocks because all the steps of the production process need to be optimized.”).
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fuel-related compounds.37 Research may even bridge these categories,
for example, by breeding enzymes into the plants themselves.
The leap forward that is necessary to commercialize cellulosic
ethanol will require a great investment of time and money in basic
research and development. Any company that makes such an investment will require some protection of its position to assure a return on its investment. This has been traditionally viewed as the role
of intellectual property and, in particular, patent rights. For this reason, the intellectual property environment for biofuels may be one of
the most important factors in the emergence of economical and efficient cellulosic sources.
B. Patents as a Critical Research Incentive
For many with dreams of profiting from a research breakthrough,
patents are viewed as the ultimate tool. They provide their owners
with the right to exclude others from most practical applications of
the claimed invention.38 Although patents exist for a relatively short
period, particularly when the time to develop and market an invention is taken off the top,39 they may give a patentee control over key
technology at a critical stage, generating great rewards. Conversely,
without patent protection, an inventor is left to rely on secrecy to
prevent competitors from benefiting from his or her research and development efforts.40 Public use without any protection may lead to
free riding,41 which actually puts the inventor at a disadvantage visà-vis a competitor.

37. PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29, at 278; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BIOENERGY
RESEARCH CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SCIENCE 9 (2008), available at
http://genomicsgtl.energy.gov/centers/brcbrochure_hq.pdf.
38. The U.S. Patent Act gives patent owners the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or offering to sell the invention in this country, and it gives them the right to
exclude others from importing it from another country without the authority of the patent
owner. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 271(e)(4)(B) (2000).
39. See, e.g., Daniel. R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 618 (2006) (indicating that although a patent term runs
twenty years from the filing date, “[t]he effective patent life is shorter, as time spent prosecuting the application before the relevant patent examining authority comes off the top of
the twenty-year term, leaving most patentees with approximately eighteen years”).
40. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-95 (2003) (arguing that inventors will choose to keep
inventions secret if the disclosures accompanying patent protection result in more losses
than the exclusivity will provide in gains).
41. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual
Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 333 (1995) (“The fundamental justification for creating property rights in the results of innovation is to deal with the appropriability problem.”); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717-18 (2001) (discussing Demsetz’s description of
property rights as a solution to problem of underproduction when the inputs cannot otherwise be fully appropriated). But for a detailed criticism of the potential overuse of the con-
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It is asserted that the amount of patenting actually serves as a
barometer of research activity.42 Observing the changes in the patent
landscape over time yields a trove of information about who is inventing what and, perhaps more importantly, who is in the position
to control the most essential technology. Of course, many other dynamics affect research and development spending, and it has been
suggested that the impact of patents differs significantly by industry.43 For example, because product life span is short in computerrelated technologies, the utility of patents is perceived to be very
small, and companies generally do not innovate in order to obtain patents.44 On the other hand, other industries clearly engage in research with a view toward obtaining patents. Biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals tend to be at the top of this group, and advocates for
each vehemently argue that their success would be all but impossible
without strong patent rights.45
In predicting the impact of patent rights on next-generation biofuel technologies, it is reasonable to place them in the same category
as biotechnology. The anticipated advances are biologic in nature,
and the agricultural industry has a robust history of utilizing biotechnology research to increase crop yields, reduce insect infestation,
and resist herbicides.46 This field of “agricultural biotechnology” has

cept of free riding in justifying intellectual property law, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2005).
42. See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1701-02 (1990) (“In spite of all the difficulties, patents statistics
remain a unique resource for the analysis of the process of technical change.”); Jean O.
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 441-43 (2004).
43. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI.
173, 174-75, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (surveying dependency on patents in 100 firms in twelve distinct industries).
44. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32
RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001).
45. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 17-20 (2003) [hereinafter FTC, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting the almost universal recognition of importance of patents in biotechnology industry—
“[p]articipants stated that the biotechnology industry would not have emerged ‘but for the
existence of predictable patents’ ”); Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium 35
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9431.pdf.
46. See JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ADOPTION OF BIOENGINEERED CROPS 4-7 (2002) (detailing the extent of adoption of bioengineered herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant crops in the U.S.); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (USDA-ERS), ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY 3, 10-11 (2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY] (providing an overview of several important genetic modifications to
crops). See generally DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST (2001) (describing the rationale for and implications of the increased use of biotechnology in agriculture).
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become extremely important;47 it is considered a distinct form of biotechnology and has largely taken the place of plant breeding and
chemical design in the research programs of large agribusinesses.48
As with biotechnology, the effort to create patentable advancements
is quite resource-intensive. An agribusiness firm’s investment in research and development must employ a very forward-looking perspective on its ability to profit from the market, which creates a natural dependence on patent rights, among other mechanisms,49 to provide for a return on investment.
Interestingly, there is already evidence of increased patenting in
biofuels as the energy resource has received more attention from
government and industry. Looking simply at patents related to ethanol production from cellulosic biomass, one can see that patent applications have risen significantly in recent years (Figure 1).

47. ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 46, at 1-2.
48. Id. For an excellent account of the struggle for the preeminence of biotechnology
in the agricultural industry, see CHARLES, supra note 46, at 117-18.
49. An alternative to legal protection is a biological barrier to unauthorized use and
propagation. For example, the much discussed genetic use restriction technology (GURT),
also known as “terminator technology,” serves this function. See Richard Caplan, The Ongoing Debate over Terminator Technology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 751, 770-72 (2007);
Sergio H. Lence & Dermot J. Hayes, Technology Fees Versus GURTs in the Presence of
Spillovers: World Welfare Impacts, 8 AGBIOFORUM 172, 173 (2005).
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FIGURE 1: PATENTS RELATED TO ETHANOL PRODUCED FROM CELLULOSIC
FEEDSTOCKS50

Biofuel innovators51 have clearly responded to the interest in alternate fuels with increased research and development efforts52
(though the backlash against biofuels may induce a leveling off at
some point in the near future).
C. The More Complex Reality of Patents as a Potential
Innovation Barrier
The above discussion may lead one to conclude that stronger patent rights automatically lead to more innovation and that greater
50. To obtain a broad view of the patents related to cellulosic ethanol production, the
authors accessed the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) issued patents
database (http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm) and used a search string
designed to identify all patents containing relevant terms that resided in plant and microorganism classes: “(ccl/800/$ or ccl/435/$) and ethanol and (lignocellulos$ or cellulos$) and
(fuel or fuels).” All the patents in the resulting group were individually reviewed to determine actual relevance, and unrelated patents were discarded. In addition, the authors
compared the search results with an independent survey of the biofuel patent environment
appearing in each issue of the publication Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining to ensure
that the essential patents were captured. See, e.g., Mara Staffilani et al., Patent Intelligence, 2 BIOFUELS, BIOPRODUCTS & BIOREFINING 358, 359-72 (2008). However, the authors
readily acknowledge that the search results may not be a perfect representation of biofuel
patenting, as any search likely results in both type I errors (nonbiofuel patents included)
and type II errors (biofuel patents excluded).
51. Such innovators include recent startups, such as Xethanol, see Global Energy
Holdings Group, http://xethanol.com (last visited June 1, 2009), and large agribusinesses,
such as Monsanto, see Press Release, Monsanto, Monsanto Company and Mendel Biotechnology
Announce
Cellulosic
Biofuels
Collaboration
(Apr.
28,
2008),
http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=596.
52. Patents in the study group were collected through December 2008.
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numbers of patents indicate more progress and a greater likelihood
of breakthrough innovation in the market. Under these assumptions,
one could reasonably conclude that the increasing number of biofuelrelated patents is evidence of a robust innovation environment. Inventions and patents, however, do not exist in discrete silos of development and profit, with competitors having only parallel interests.
There is often conflict. Patent rights can interact with the innovative
efforts of others and actually limit the development of new products
and services—or at least add to their expense. Some believe that the
barriers can be so high as to require intervention in order to achieve
a sufficient level of commercialization of important technologies.53
The conflict in innovation environments is due to the intangible
nature of intellectual property. Unlike, for example, real property
rights, which are linked to a discrete piece of land or fixture upon
that land, intellectual property rights are not associated with a particular object. Patents cover ideas that may not even be captured in a
physical embodiment.54 This means that a broad technology field can
be impacted in two dimensions. First, patent rights can be so expansive or “foundational” as to cover entire categories of goods or services, regardless of whether the owner actually produces them.55
Second, it is possible for different rights to impact several aspects of
a single technological embodiment, forming a thicket that one must
traverse to market without infringing. Under certain market conditions, patent owners may take advantage of such environments to
hold up the efficient development of future innovations.
1. Initial Presence
Technologies

of

Patent

Control

over

Fundamental

A building block or foundational patent can be defined as one with
claims covering a basic aspect of the technology.56 It is fundamental
53. Michael Heller, who in 1998 joined Rebecca Eisenberg in describing the “anticommons,” see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12, has recently authored a book that proposes such policy revision. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
54. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the
word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather
than to a physical embodiment of that idea. The statute does not contain any express requirement that an invention must be reduced to practice before it can be patented.”).
55. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2007). Some might also call these “pioneering” inventions, and it has been argued that they should be accorded much power in order to encourage innovation. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 440-41 (2004) (discussing Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory, which would provide
substantial power for early-stage innovation, and noting that it has become “a standard
part of the law-and-economics literature on patent law”).
56. See, e.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 55, at 1751 (2007) (characterizing foundational
patents as those “with broad claims that appeared important to a large percentage of work
in the area”).
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to the way any specific embodiment will function. Foundational patents need not cover the entirety of important products or services,
and they may have been filed long before such embodiments were
envisioned. In fact, it is most likely that such patents will cover only
a part or aspect of popular products. They may even cover enabling
technology that relates to the manufacture or testing of a product but
is not embodied in the product itself.57 Actual participants in the
market may not even own them. What is essential is that an entire
class of products or services cannot be produced without using the
patent and no work-around is readily available. It is essentially impossible to participate in the field without treading on the patent
owner’s rights.58 In such cases, the patentee has the power to prevent
marketing of the covered products absent authorization.
There are essentially two ways a patent can attain fundamental
status. One is that it covers a technology that is so groundbreaking
and useful that industry widely accepts it as the base for future innovation.59 By definition, there is no alternative that will produce the
same result. A second is that government or industry groups agree to
adopt the covered technology as a standard.60 In this case, there may
be viable alternatives, but adherence to the standard precludes them.
Such determinations can be enhanced by network economics, switching costs, or inertia that confer great power on a broad patent covering the standard.61
57. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 333-34 (2006) (describing the patenting of fundamental enabling technologies in biotechnology, such as the synthesis of artificial
antibody molecules).
58. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39,
93 (2008) (describing such patents as part of the “intellectual infrastructure” and arguing
that “[a]bsent efficient licensing . . . exclusive rights on this infrastructure may inhibit myriad downstream applications”).
59. Mark A. Lemley identifies several of these “building blocks” in fields such as biotechnology, computers, chemistry, and television. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606-14 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology].
60. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.1a (2002 & Supp. 2008); Mark
A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C.
L. REV. 149, 154-55 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (describing how irreversible
commitments to standards elevate the power a patent owner has to extract royalties); Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 539, 544-45 (2007) (“The establishment of industry standards, which often
takes years to complete, can give market power to individual patents that was not present
before the standard-setting process began.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 523 (1998) (“To the
extent intellectual property rights confer ownership interests in a strong network standard, they may create durable market power in network markets.”).
61. See Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Tying, 44 AM.
BUS. L.J. 521, 563 (2007) (“A second major feature of modern network industries is that
consumers may face significant switching costs in attempting to move from an incumbent
firm to a competitor.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated
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In the biotechnology field, perhaps the best example of a fundamental technology patent is the one issued for Cohen and Boyer’s
gene cloning technology.62 Another good candidate is the patent covering the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) process.63 Both concepts
are essential to modern biotechnology research, and it is hard to imagine any biotech company or academic lab that does not make use of
both. In agricultural biotechnology, one can look to the patents on
transformation by Agrobacterium—a mechanism for transporting
and incorporating genetic material into a plant cell—as a significant
foundational technology that reflects a voluntary industry acknowledgment of supremacy.64 Another example is Monsanto’s patent on
Roundup® and genetically modified Roundup-Ready® seeds.65
At this stage, it is difficult to determine what technologies will be
the building blocks of second-generation biofuels. However, given the
hope for a breakthrough in efficient cellulosic conversion, it is not
unreasonable to imagine that such patents will issue. Additionally,
existing technology that is applicable to general agriculture could be
just as important to biofuel production. For example, technology for
genetically modifying crops or herbicide and insect resistance may
play a key role regardless of the specific gene enhancement. To the
extent that one form of this technology proves essential in biofuel
production, it will be, for all intents and purposes, foundational.
Interestingly, the breadth of a fundamental technology patent can
also be an important weakness if it is the result of overclaiming. If a
patent is determined to be overbroad in its claims, it can be deemed
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1476-81 (2002) (modeling switching
costs from a patented good in the context of brand loyalty); Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents,
Antitrust, and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 509, 510 n.3 (2007) (“However, given that consensus itself is usually extremely costly—standards often take years to
develop—switching costs are almost always present, even if very large investments in implementation have yet to be made.”).
62. Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent
No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 40-42 (1997); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300 (2003).
63. Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No. 4,683,202 (filed
Oct. 25, 1985) (issued July 28, 1987). Mark A. Lemley notes that this patent was widely
and successfully licensed but ultimately declared unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 611.
64. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 57, at 335-36 (describing the significance of the patents to the agricultural biotechnology industry). The ownership of the patented technology
was actually a matter of significant legal dispute between four entities—Bayer Crop
Science, Max Planck Society, Garching Innovation, and Monsanto—that was apparently
resolved only recently. Id.; Press Release, Monsanto Co., Bayer Cropscience, Max Planck
Society, Monsanto Company Resolve Agrobacterium Patent Dispute (Feb. 4, 2005),
http://www.monsanto.co.uk/news/ukshowlib.phtml?uid=8561.
65. Chimeric Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral Promoters, U.S. Patent
No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 4, 1994).
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invalid and essentially disappear.66 There is an inherent risk in aggressively enforcing such patents. In many cases, a preferable strategy is to tread lightly and license broadly, leaving the right untested
in a formal legal proceeding.67 Several foundational patents in biotechnology have followed this pattern.68 This creates a de facto limitation on the power of foundational patents.
Another important limitation on fundamental technology patent
control is the passage of time. Due to the strict conditions of patentability, such applications generally end up being filed early in the lifespan of the technology.69 Any attempt to cover a greater breadth of
invention following the disclosure of a narrower embodiment would
commonly be rejected as anticipated or obvious.70 And while it is
possible for one to file a patent on foundational technology early but
wait to bring it to issuance until after the valuable applications become clear, the impact of such efforts will be limited since a patent
term is calculated from the filing date.71 Moreover, one cannot simply
extend the power of a broad patent by filing subsequent, related patents based on the original disclosure because the original claimed
invention will be available to competitors once the initial right expires.72 The result is that foundational patents usually cannot domi66. The three controls on the problem of overclaiming are the requirements that patent claims be nonobvious and enabled and that the patentee provide a written description
of the invention sufficient to demonstrate that it was fully conceived. See Cahoy, supra
note 39, at 614-15.
67. This is allegedly the strategy employed by the famed Jerome Lemelson, who induced some of the country’s largest companies to settle cases related to his questionable
bar code patents rather than pursue cases in court. See Susan Hansen, Breaking the (Bar)
Code, IP L. & BUS., Mar. 2004.
68. See Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 610-11 (describing widespread licensing of foundational biotechnology patents). But see Kumar & Rai, supra note
55, at 1754 (suggesting that the historical pattern of broad licensing in biotechnology may
not occur in current technological contexts).
69. Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “Firstto-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 768-70 (1998) (explaining the requirement that a prospective patentee move forward with patenting diligently). The early disclosure incentive is
even greater in countries that have a first-to-file system (which is most of the world). Id. at
757 (“In fact, every nation in the world except the United States and the Philippines follows a first-to-file system.”). The patent rules also encourage a complete early disclosure,
lest the doctrine of “prosecution history estoppel” narrow claims that were drafted too
broadly or ambiguously. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 216-21 (2002).
70. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 610-11 (“[A] number of early
Federal Circuit decisions gave biotechnology patents a narrow scope, making it impossible
to patent a broad genus based even on pioneering work and leaving the development of
that genus open to others.”).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The doctrine of prosecution laches may even serve as
a barrier to delayed patenting within the twenty-year time period. See Symbol Techs., Inc.
v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
amended in part on reh’g, 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
72. Some refer to the process of extending patent rights through subsequent filings as
“evergreening.” See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
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nate a technology for very long. In industries with long research and
development lead times, they may expire just as a technology matures, or even before.
Finally, to the extent that fundamental technology patents result
from federal grants, the government possesses the ability to compel
licensing on reasonable terms. Under the Bayh-Dole Act’s so-called
“march-in” rights provision, the granting agency can compel the patent owner to license the invention if it is necessary, inter alia, to
“achieve practical application of the subject invention” or “meet requirements for public use.”73 To date, such provisions have not been
used,74 but they remain viable and may serve as bargaining chips
for policymakers.
Because foundational patents in biofuel technology are likely to
experience the above limitations in a manner similar to general
biotechnology,75 their impact could be blunted. Such patents could
figure prominently in early start-up periods, but they may not
present an appreciable barrier to commercialization as the technology matures.76 Instead of breadth, the larger patent menace may be
the infamous thicket.
2. Growing Thickets Through Diverse Ownership
The world of applied science is filled with examples of “hot” technologies that suddenly capture the attention of academia and industry.77 The shared interest among several parties in a particular inno13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348-49 (2007). However, subsequent patents do
not, in and of themselves, restrict the use of inventions in prior patents. Unless some sort
of regulatory structure (such as FDA approval) extends the power of subsequent patents,
evergreening is rarely a major obstacle to innovation.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
74. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 628 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Patent Trolls].
75. See supra notes 27-37 for a description of biofuel technology, particularly secondgeneration research, which is essentially biotechnology based. Scholars have suggested
that biotechnology did not suffer greatly from foundational patent coverage in part because
the inventors were primarily located at universities, which “had strong norms against patenting, particularly in medical inventions.” Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note
59, at 609-10. Thus, the lack of intellectual property holdup was a result of unusual conditions that will not repeat themselves, particularly in view of the greater emphasis on patenting by universities. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-19 (discussing the
rise in university patenting and the increased likelihood that they will engage in technology holdups).
76. See Duffy, supra note 55, at 464-75 (suggesting that early, broad patents channel
competition that pushes back the filing dates, resulting in early dedication to the public,
and presenting a model to demonstrate the concept).
77. For an economic explanation of this behavior, see James H. Cardon & Dan Sasaki,
Preemptive Search and R&D Clustering, 29 RAND J. ECON 324 (1998). Historical examples in agricultural biotechnology include the race for genetically controlled herbicide resistance. See CHARLES, supra note 46, at 60-73; see also Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478-79 (2006); Malcolm
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vation results in multiple research and development programs. Patents will typically result from such programs, even if the immediate
practical applications are unclear. The property space can quickly
become populated by a diverse collection of rights.78 These rights may
overlap or cover different aspects of the same product or service. This
is true even when there are patents that claim a commercial embodiment of a product (a genetically modified seed, for example), as the
embodiment may still be subject to patents on enabling technology or
some other inherent aspect (a fundamental plant cloning technology
or a particular herbicide regimen necessary to produce the product,
for example). Overlapping rights may form what has become widely
known as a patent thicket, a state in which it is impossible to find a
clear path to commercialization without intruding on another’s (or
several others’) patent rights.79 Before a product or service can be
marketed, all owners must assent, as any one owner has the power to
hold
up
(or
at
least
impose
significant
costs
on)
the technology.80
Theoretically, if all property owners could be identified, bargaining would always proceed to a rational end and the technology would
be available at some price.81 However, it has been suggested that behavioral barriers to bargaining remain when one party perceives an
outsized opportunity to hold up another’s valuable use. For example,
Lemley and Shapiro assert that complementary patent owners will
tend to demand excessive royalty rates that will make an invention

Gladwell, In the Air, NEW YORKER, May 12, 2008, at 50 (discussing the phenomenon of simultaneous invention when the pursuits of research programs are not necessarily public).
78. The rush to control a technology field of high interest through intellectual property is termed a patent race by economists. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 40, at 300-01
(describing patent races); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV.
115, 183-90 (2003) (describing the phenomenon and noting the three primary problems
with races).
79. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124-26 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001) (describing as a basis of patent thicket, the “holdup” problem “where hundreds if not thousands of patents . . . can potentially read on [the same] product”). A primary reason for the overlap is that patent rights include no use rights, but only the right to
exclude others; thus, ownership of a patent conveys no freedom to operate. See Christopher
M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of
Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 302 (2007).
80. Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 613-14 (discussing the rise of patent holdups and, by extension, patent “trolls”). After the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, it is less
likely that the owner of a patent on a minor aspect of an invention will be granted injunctive rights. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
81. See F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
101, 108 (2007) (disputing the general notion that the number of patents in and of itself
creates a hold-out problem and noting that “[p]atentees have a strong incentive to encourage use, not to block it”).
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unmarketable.82 Heller points to research suggesting that there is an
embedded tendency for such individualistic behavior.83 But a review
of the most commonly discussed examples indicates that this behavior is tied to a situation in which technology is already in production
and cannot be abandoned; the manufacturer is over a proverbial barrel. On the other hand, if the manufacturer has yet to invest in substantial development efforts and can simply walk away from the
project, the holdout power is dramatically reduced.84 Thus, it makes
sense to distinguish between ex ante patent negotiation, which occurs prior to development, and ex post negotiation, which occurs after development, in presuming persistent holdout behavior. The ex
ante negotiation context is the correct one for biofuels and should
stimulate rational bargaining.
Thus, the most troublesome quality of a thicket in nascent fields is
the risk that one may not be able to conclusively determine all of the
patents that read on a product or service. Relevant patents can pop
up and catch even sophisticated manufacturers by surprise. Although it is possible to search the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s database for inventions that appear facially similar, one might
miss relevant patents due to subtle differences in language or an
overly narrow conception of what constitutes an inventive aspect.85 In
addition, relevant patents may come to issuance subsequent to a
comprehensive search (though the surprise is somewhat reduced by
the ability to search published applications).86
Patent thickets have been theorized to act as a major obstacle to
technology development in some fields. A single product may need to
traverse so many overlapping rights that it requires hundreds, if not
thousands, of licenses for production.87 The inevitability of failing to
82. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2003-04, 2010-11 (2007).
83. See HELLER, supra note 53, at 44 (citing the research of Sven Vanneste et al.,
From “Tragedy” to “Disaster”: Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 104 (2006), and Steven Stewart & David J. Bjornstad, An Experimental Investigation of Predictions and Symmetries in the Tragedies of the Commons and
Anticommons (Joint Inst. for Energy and Env’t, Report No. JIEE 2002-07, 2002)).
84. Lemley and Shapiro agree that this option reduces the holdup problem, but they
assert that the likelihood of royalty overcharges persists unless the patent is “nothing special” or so “ironclad” as to be unassailable in litigation. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82,
at 2003-04. Of course, the existence of royalty overcharging in this context does not mean
that the invention will be abandoned.
85. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1298-99 (2008) (“Because of the notorious difficulty in
assessing the breadth and coverage of patent claims, patent searches can be difficult
and expensive.”).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) (requiring publication of most U.S. patents after
eighteen months).
87. See FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 45, ch. 3, at 34-35 (2003); Lemley,
Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 613; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 55 (2007).
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license at least one right supposedly leads to the rise of so-called patent “trolls”—patent owners who hold up technology for a toll without
contributing anything to the progress of the useful arts.88 The additional licensing and transaction costs can lead to underutilization of
resources under a theoretical construct known as the “tragedy of
the anticommons.”89
Significantly, thickets or anticommons do not appear to be equally
problematic in all industries. For example, some suggest that computer and software-related technologies—which, not coincidentally,
are the industrial segments currently pushing for patent reform90—
have a much greater problem with thicket formation than pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.91 Developing fields may suffer more
deeply from this pitfall. Before wide commercialization, diverse
groups of inventors seeking to take advantage of an uncertain future
market may exist.92 The lack of clear market leaders reduces the barriers to possible adoption of new technology and makes the research
and development risk worthwhile.
Are thickets or the anticommons likely to be a problem for biofuels? It should be acknowledged at the outset that these are elusive
phenomena, and no one has devised a generally accepted method of
identifying them; any predictions are necessarily somewhat speculative. However, there is certainly the potential for thicket formation if
one analogizes the similarity in biofuel industry structure to early
stage biotechnology. And early empirical evidence supports the possibility of thicket formation. The ownership of relevant patents is
quite diverse, at least with respect to other highly developed segments of agricultural biotechnology. For example, one can compare
the biofuel patent environment to that for genetically modified, her88. Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 629.
89. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12. Some scholars distinguish between thickets and the anticommons, while acknowledging that they are closely related.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1611-15 (2003). More recently, Mark A. Lemley suggested that the anticommons may not
be as problematic as many believe because many companies simply “ignore patents” and
innovate. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (2008).
90. See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 45.
91. Patent Reform Legislation – Public Comments on Substitute HR 2795 and the Role
of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm.
(2005) (testimony of Mark A. Lemley), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Lemley.pdf (“[P]harmaceutical patents are more likely to cover a whole drug, rather than one of 5,000 different components of a semiconductor
chip. So patent owners in the pharmaceutical industries don’t have to worry about and [sic]
endless stream of patent owners asserting rights in their drugs.”). In his recent book, Heller makes the interesting assertion that pharmaceutical companies actually are troubled
by the anticommons, but they essentially will not admit it because they are more concerned about the effect that weaker patents would have on challenges from generic pharmaceutical competitors. See HELLER, supra note 53, at 77.
92. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-19.
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bicide-resistant plants (Table 1). The latter is a useful comparison
group because the classification is specifically directed to a technology that could be considered the epitome of agricultural biotechnology
in the 1980s and 1990s.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF PATENT OWNERSHIP IN THREE SEGMENTS OF
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

Number of
Patents
Number of Discrete
Patent Owners96
Percent Ownership
by Top 3 Firms

Corn GM Plants93

Non-Corn GM
Plants94

Biofuel
Technologies95

525

1013

239

37

118

77

85.0%

69.6%

33.5%

Not only is the number of owners proportionally different in each
segment, but the percentage of ownership is also dramatically lower

93. Numbers derived from the USPTO patents database for 1988 through 2008.
USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/searchadv.htm (last visited June 1, 2009). Using classification 800, sub-classification 300.1 as a
Boolean search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living Organisms and Unmodified
Parts Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide resistant plant which is transgenic or mutant, and the plant is maize), relevant patents were identified. The authors chose this database, as well as the one noted in infra note 94, because its contents—patents directed to
plants that have been genetically modified for herbicide resistance—are very specific to
agricultural biotechnology and are unlikely to be contaminated with patents related to
other industries. However, it is important to note that the consolidation of patent ownership in corn and noncorn GM plant inventions may be the result of overall industry trends
rather than a past thicket/anticommons problem in this particular class.
94. Patents identified using classification 800, sub-classification 300 as a Boolean
search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living Organisms and Unmodified Parts
Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide resistant plant which is transgenic or mutant).
95. Patents identified using the search described in supra note 50.
96. Ownership determined by utilizing the assignment information on the face of the
patent and modifying where dictated by using the USPTO’s assignment records
(http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat) and public information regarding corporate consolidation. Patent ownership was consolidated as follows:
Monsanto:

Asgrow, Stine Seeds (shared), Delta Pine, Seminis, Calgene,
Emergent Genetics, Agracetus, Dekalb, Holden’s Foundation,
MGI Pharma, First Line.
Pioneer Hi-Bred: DuPont, Hybrinova, Mertec, EvoGene, Bigemma.
Bayer Crop Sci.: Aventis, Rhone Poulenc Rhorer, Hoescht, Schering, AgrEvo,
Plant Genetic Systems.
Syngenta:
Novartis, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, Advanta, Garst, Northrup
King, Mogen, Zeneca, J.C. Robinson, Golden Harvest.
Dow:
Cargil, Agrigentics, Mycogen, Illinois Foundation.
Limagrain:
Soygenetics, Harris Moran.
BASF:
American Cyanamid.
Danisco:
Genencor, Xyrofin.
Verenium:
Diversa, Celunol.
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in biofuel technology.97 In the latter, no small group of firms
is dominant.98
One might reasonably believe that, without additional influences,
the biofuel patent landscape will grow dense and populated by trolls.
Significantly, innovation may be underincentivized due to the costs
in traversing the dense patent space. However, there are private
forces that may have a great ability to reshape ownership trends and
realign innovation. Whether they are beneficial to public innovation
goals depends on the manner in which they are carried out.
III. THE PARADIGM OF PRIVATE ORDERING
Private ordering is the concept of self-regulation and realignment.99 The term often refers to interactions in the absence of law.100
However, a modern application is the private allocation of rights and
duties against the background of public enforcement, with private
contracting being a primary example of this form of mixed ordering.101 This Article applies the mixed ordering definition and contrasts it with government regulation and reallocation of assets.102
97. Note that, as a general rule, the percentage owned by the top three groups would
be expected to be higher in the early stages of development, as only a few individuals or
firms invest in invention. Thus, the contrast between biofuel and genetically modified
plants is especially striking.
98. There is also evidence of a difference between biofuel technology and agricultural
biotechnology in general. If one compares the biofuel ownership concentration to an extremely detailed U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS)
calculation of agricultural biotechnology ownership patterns, one can see that the latter is
clearly more concentrated. See USDA-ERS, Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property: Overview Chart 4, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic4.htm
(last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter USDA-ERS Patent Consolidation] (demonstrating a
concentration of nearly forty percent for the top ten firms).
99. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324-29 (2002)
(noting that private ordering can be viewed on a spectrum with different levels of government participation).
100. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards
a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2338 (2004) (stating that
the literature of private ordering principally examines merchant communities that enforce
agreements without state-sponsored courts).
101. See Jean Braucher, New Frontiers in Private Ordering—An Introduction, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2007) (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a
means by which the state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some
promises.”); see also F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 115 n.15 (2007)
(stating, in the context of intellectual property transactions, that “we use ‘private ordering’
to refer to circumstances where parties, given extant legal and regulatory regimes, order
the substance of their affairs and transactions as they see fit and resort to the judicial system for enforcement”).
102. Although the ordering is private in the sense that firms continue to own the rights
and decide when to deal, it is certainly possible for government to play a facilitating role. It
can create incentives for ordering, for example, by rewarding efficiency and progress in
technology development as endpoints, see, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 207, 121 Stat. 1492, 1531 (grants for production of ad-
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In this light, private ordering is a common aspect of the
business environment.
The notion that private industry is inclined to collaborate to resolve patent barriers is not surprising. There is an obvious advantage
to coordinating with other market participants to identify and address intellectual property rights that might complicate the introduction of new technology, particularly if a major player does not own it.
The difficult task is to do it in a way that does not risk antitrust exposure. Whenever competitors collaborate, there is a danger that
they may be entering into an agreement in restraint of trade.103 This
risk is compounded when the agreement concerns a market exclusion
device such as a patent.
Interestingly, it seems that some industries are more inclined toward order. In determining whether second-generation biofuels constitute such an industry, it is worth first considering the strong tradition of collaboration in the sector that is most analogous: agricultural biotechnology. The analysis is particularly significant because
it is a field that is not plagued by patent trolls. From agricultural
biotechnology’s history, one can identify several mechanisms that
firms have used over the years to address intellectual property barriers. In general, they have survived antitrust scrutiny and thus provide a roadmap for the future of the biofuel industry if it is to avoid
the pitfalls of thickets and holdouts.

vanced biofuels), and by articulating legal structures that will not be challenged, see, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf. Alternatively, government can discourage ordering by creating uncertainty in antitrust prosecution or failing to follow through on guiding technology policy. In addition, regulation can play a major part in encouraging ordering
by conferring market power on certain technology and eliminating the value in others. For
example, genetically modified crops have permitted the technology to gain an important
hold on certain types of food, but the extent of adoption is limited by regulation. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (WHO), FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, MODERN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EVIDENCE-BASED STUDY 4-5 (2005) (describing the genetically modified food crops that have been approved for sale in some countries but not others). But see Kieff & Paredes, supra note 101, at 145-46 (noting that ill-timed regulation
can have a destabilizing effect on private ordering). This is something significantly less
than central economic control, but it is an incursion on the pure market. One might argue
that government action is best reserved unless there is evidence of a market failure.
103. However, in its 2000 guidelines on the matter, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) went out of their way to make clear that “[s]uch
collaborations often are not only benign but procompetitive,” so it is important to understand the legal limits. FED. TRADE COMM’N AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 1 (2000) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ
2000 GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.

2009]

PRIVATE ORDERING

437

A. Agricultural Biotechnology as a Historical Analogy
A primary reason the history of agricultural biotechnology intellectual property provides such a good model for what will occur in
biofuels is that the connection to the basic science is the same.104 In
addition, many of the same companies that were involved in the development of early agricultural biotechnology are seeking a role in
biofuels.105 It is a rich story of technological development that is both
informative and intriguing.
The basic techniques in agricultural biotechnology were first developed in universities and government labs in the 1970s.106 Interest
quickly spread to existing agricultural giants like Monsanto that had
been dependent on chemical herbicides and fertilizers for tweaking
crop yields.107 The large agricultural firms worked to integrate genetically manipulated crops into their product lineup to generate sales.
This was done either through original research and development,108
outright purchases of technologies or smaller companies, joint development arrangements, or technology licensing.109 Eventually, genetic
science began to dominate certain crop segments such as soybeans,110
and farmers began to view it as necessary to enjoy substantial yields.
When agricultural biotechnology was in its infancy, only a few researchers and firms were involved in patenting their inventions.111 As
interest grew and it was perceived as an integral technology for the

104. See supra notes 27-37 (describing the biotechnology-related science of biofuels).
105. See sources cited supra note 51. However, the research undertaken for this Article
suggests the patent environment is strongly characterized by enzyme-related companies.
See supra note 50 and accompanying figure (charting patents resulting from a search for
patents related to cellulosic ethanol production).
106. See
Margie
Patlak,
Beyond
Discovery:
Designer
Seeds
(2003),
http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.txt.asp?a=167 (describing the development of
basic agricultural genetic science and highlighting its university origins in the context of a
National Academy of Sciences-produced series of foundational stories).
107. See, e.g., CHARLES, supra note 46, at 1-23 (providing a detailed and conversational
account of Monsanto’s growing interest in biotechnology techniques for manipulating
plants); Biotechnology Research: Weighing the Options for a New Public-Private Balance,
AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1999, at 22 (“[I]t is increasingly evident that a sizable share of what
was once considered exotic basic science . . . is being conducted in the private sphere by
large life science firms, such as Novartis, Monsanto, DuPont, and Celera, and by many
smaller biotech companies.”); James H. Moore, Transaction Costs, Trust and Property
Rights as Determinants of Organizational, Industrial and Technological Change: A Case
Study in the Life Sciences Sector (1998) (on file with authors).
108. Biotechnology Research, supra note 107, at 22.
109. JOHN L. KING, CONCENTRATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURAL INPUT
INDUSTRIES 9-11 (2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib763/
aib763.pdf; Michael R. Ward, Emerging Competition Policy Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 504, 515-20 (2000).
110. FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & MCBRIDE, supra note 46, at 4 (“Herbicide-tolerant soybean[] . . . [u]se expanded to about 17 percent of the soybean acreage in 1997, to 56 percent
in 1999, and to 68 percent in 2001.”).
111. KING, supra note 109, at 6.
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future of the agricultural industry, more entities filed for patent protection.112 For a time, the patent landscape became quite diverse. But
a wave of consolidation soon swept the industry. Large companies
like Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta began buying smaller companies to create large portfolios of patented technologies.113 It was well
known that they sought power, in part, through the ownership of key
intellectual property assets. Consolidation was an important means
of obtaining more control. Other players with connections to the
pharmaceutical field, such as Novartis and Aventis, were also involved at various stages.114 Most of these efforts resulted in either
spin-offs, such as Bayer Crop Sciences, or the agricultural biotechnology assets being sold to one of the top four firms.115 Eventually, a
few companies once again dominated the patent landscape.116
The upside to the wave of consolidation is that the industry is now
relatively compartmentalized. There are certainly a number of patent lawsuits among the big companies,117 but there is little evidence
that small parties or patent trolls are creating holdups in biotechnology development in general.118 The potential for patent thickets
has been significantly reduced. Interestingly, there has not been a
great deal of resistance to these arrangements by antitrust authori-

112. See John H. Barton & Peter Berger, Patenting Agriculture, 17 ISSUES SCI. & TECH.
43, 44-45 (2001) (describing several historical and legal events that led to a surge in patents on agricultural biotechnology).
113. KING, supra note 109, at 9-11.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id. at 7 fig.3.
116. The USDA’s Economic Research Service has provided a dramatic illustration of
the consolidation trend in agricultural biotechnology patents by graphing patent ownership with and without consolidation figured in. See USDA-ERS Patent Consolidation, supra note 98.
117. A search of Westlaw’s LitAlert database finds that Monsanto, Syngenta, and Pioneer Hi-Bred have been involved in forty-seven patent cases filed since August 2005.
118. The biotechnology industry’s primary lobbying organization, the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), issued a report in 2008 on pending patent reform litigation in
which it addressed the existence of trolls. ANN MILLS & PATTI TERESKERZ, BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUS. ORG., PROPOSED PATENT REFORM LEGISLATION: LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICAL DATA
USED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE 20 (2008), available at http://bio.org/ip/
domestic/UVA_Limitations_of_Empirical_Data.pdf. It found that there was essentially no
empirical evidence of trolls in major studies that motivated patent reform. Id. The most interesting highlight was of a survey by Walsh et al. of biomedical researchers that asked
about the reasons for project abandonment. Id. at 17-18. “Too many patents” was a concern
cited by only three percent of respondents. Id. Notably, Michael Heller rejects Walsh’s findings by asserting that scientists are not aware of the effects of the anticommons. See
HELLER, supra note 53, at 66-67, 77. He seems to suggest, in the face of survey evidence
that contradicts his theory, that no survey can effectively capture the anticommons due to
a variety of inherent biases or incomplete information. See Damien Geradin et al., The
Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 159 (2008) (“[V]oluntary market-based solutions appear
capable of handling most of the licensing issues arising from any [anticommons] problems.”).
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ties,119 though as discussed below, the possibility of anticompetitive
behavior looms.
Given the similarities in technology, one predicts that biofuels will
follow the general model of agricultural biotechnology. But this is only the starting point for the analysis. There are differences that may
play an important role in charting a slightly different future for biofuels. For example, biofuels are part of a national energy policy,120 the
core field of biotechnology has developed substantially since its infancy in the early 1980s, and smaller entities like universities are
becoming much more savvy about owning intellectual property.121 At
the very least, these differences suggest that, although the future intellectual property environment of biofuels is greatly informed by
analogies to agricultural biotechnology, it is worth more in-depth
study to ascertain the true likelihood of consolidation. To predict consolidation, one must have an appreciation of the possible pathways
as well as the facilitating factors.
B. Beneficial Ordering Mechanisms
There are a number of possible iterations for ordering the biofuel
innovation environment. Such ordering may involve the buying and
selling of intellectual property rights to create permanent changes in
the landscape. Alternatively, it may be brought about by some kind
of licensing structure. The best form depends entirely on the owner
and the technology. In fact, a broad patent environment may actually
contain aspects of several ordering mechanisms, and the composition
may change over time.
It is important to understand that the mechanisms of private ordering described below are by no means new or unusual; in various
forms, they have long been essential tools in the management of intellectual property.122 What is different is a perspective on these
transactions as a method of large-scale private reorganization of the
119. In general, antitrust authorities have acquiesced to the agricultural biotechnology
industry mergers and licensing arrangements with only the requirement that certain assets be divested. See, e.g., Novartis AG, Docket No. C-3979 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 15,
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/novartisd_o.pdf (approving, in a consent
decree, the merger of crop sciences divisions that now exist as Syngenta).
120. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, §
202, 121 Stat. 1492, 1521-22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545) (dictating an increasing
percentage of biofuel in transportation fuel through 2022).
121. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-15.
122. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 12-13 (2004) (describing
the emergence of the business of invention in the 1800s predicated on the ability to sell
patents, engage in joint ventures, and so on). Kieff and Paredes have considered the private ordering solution from the perspective of the conditions that must exist for an individual deal to take place rather than the conditions relevant for an entire industry. See
generally Kieff & Paredes, supra note 101. Their analysis fits within the broader framework of this Article.
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intellectual property environment. Through these various techniques, a field that was once crowded, impenetrable, and unproductive can become efficient.
1. Vertical Consolidation
In a highly fractioned patent environment, one company may
struggle to gain access to sufficient patent rights to be able to market
a product or deliver a service. Two or more firms may own different
aspects of an embodiment, creating a barrier to a complete, “vertical”
integration of rights.123 One company may own a patent-enabling
technology, another company may have the rights to the commercial
embodiment, and a third company may control ancillary technology
necessary to make the invention a commercial success.124 If one firm
has significant financial resources, the simplest solution to the problem is to purchase the necessary rights from the others and consolidate it into one company.
FIGURE 2: PRIVATE ORDERING MECHANISMS

A firm could undertake vertical consolidation by focusing on purchasing or licensing the patent rights and related assets in particular. It may be a successful strategy if the rights are the only important part of the embodiment held by others and if patent owners are
willing to part with their exclusivity and possibly accompanying
123. See Ward, supra note 109, at 513-15.
124. Id.
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“know-how.”125 However, it is probably more common and often more
efficient to purchase the entire segment of a company that owns the
rights. Along with patents, a purchaser may acquire important business management structure and perhaps ancillary intellectual property such as trademarks. A distribution chain may also be an important advantage in purchasing an established company.126 Because it
is not always easy to identify the necessary patent rights, complete
vertical consolidation may take place over a period of years as the
owners become clear.
Vertical consolidation will generally not present an antitrust problem because the owners of the rights are not in competition with each
other (at least in the context of the invention in question).127 None of
the patent owners can market a product due to the holdout powers of
the others. There is technically no competition to stifle. Therefore,
the consolidation creates an overall competitive benefit because it allows something new on the market—technology that would not otherwise be available—that may compete with existing technology.
For the same reasons, vertical integration in and of itself is generally
good for overall technology development and can increase
public welfare.
2. Joint Ventures and Cross-Licensing
When the patent environment is less dispersed, it might be possible to identify one or two technology owners who could combine their
property and knowledge to make a complete product. Again, there
may be synergies in corporate know-how in addition to complementary inventions. In such cases, it might be possible to bring the intellectual property owners together to create a joint venture.128 This has
the advantage of permitting each entity to retain ownership and a
stake in the technology it developed. Beyond a certain number of intellectual property owners, however, this mechanism is probably
not workable.

125. See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGIES: VALUATION AND PRICING
12 (1999) (discussing “outright sale agreements” for intellectual property and the fact that
they are often accompanied by know-how, related machinery, and even relevant employees).
126. Professor Ward provides the example of Monsanto’s acquisition of Dekalb, noting
that it “married Monsanto’s proprietary biotechnology intellectual property with Dekalb’s
highly complementary existing presence in seed markets.” Ward, supra note 109, at 513.
127. Id. at 513-14 (noting the efficiencies of vertical consolidation); see also DOJ/FTC
1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 31 (discussing the FTC and DOJ analysis of intellectual property acquisition).
128. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 938-41 (1993) (describing
the general purpose of most joint ventures).
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Joint ventures are extremely common in agricultural biotechnology in the context of genetically modified seeds.129 Often, a large agribusiness may purchase a percentage of a smaller agribusiness in order to combine existing technologies and work to create new products. A recent example is GreenLeaf Genetics, a joint venture between DuPont and Sygenta to out-license corn and soybean genetics
and traits.130 For the most part, joint ventures can avoid antitrust
scrutiny so long as they do not excessively concentrate market power.131 If it appears that the venture is actually a kind of marketcornering merger or, worse, an agreement not to compete on existing
technologies, the joint venture can quickly lead to legal problems.132
Although a joint venture can be a significant way of facilitating
the creation of otherwise stalled products by utilizing a transformed,
hybrid corporate entity, many of the same advantages can be
achieved by licensing. Achieving these advantages is particularly
likely if there is a certain type of technology that is applicable to
many products, but a deeper relationship with the technology owner
is not advantageous.133 Licensing has elements of standard-setting
practice, but it is the product of two-party negotiation. In the context
of agricultural biotechnology, one of the best examples is RoundupReady® genetically modified crops. This technology is owned by
Monsanto but is incorporated into the seeds of some of its strongest
competitors, including DuPont (Pioneer Hi-Bred)134 and Syngenta.135
It has become a very successful, widely-adopted genetically modified
(GM) agricultural technology.136
129. KING, supra note 109, at 9-10; Ward, supra note 109, at 518.
130. Monsanto Gets Competitor in Syngenta Joint Venture, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Apr. 11,
2006, http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2006/04/10/daily11.html.
131. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 10-13 (discussing general
principles of assessing intellectual property collaborations in innovation markets, which is
where joint ventures generally take place); see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 122, at
172-74 (discussing analysis of antitrust effects of mergers and joint ventures from an innovation perspective).
132. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8-10 (providing an example
where competitors form a joint venture to eliminate competition in licensing a process for
manufacturing a drug, and noting that it could reduce competition).
133. However, the level of integration is closely related to whether the license is exclusive or nonexclusive. Exclusive licenses—wherein two companies are linked to the exclusion of other competitors—necessarily create more antitrust issues. See KING, supra note
109, at 10; Ward, supra note 109, at 519.
134. Monsanto and DuPont Modify Roundup Ready License Agreement, CHEMWEEK
BUS. DAILY, Sept. 21, 2007 (“DuPont will pay Monsanto approximately $91 million/year
over 2008-2015 for a total fee of $725 million, which DuPont says lowers its royalty payments by about 30% compared to its previous per-acre agreement.”).
135. Press Release, Monsanto, Monsanto and Syngenta Reach Royalty-Bearing Licensing Agreement on Roundup Ready 2 Yield Soybean Technology (May 23, 2008), available at
http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=604.
136. See Theodore M. Crosbie et al., Plant Breeding: Past, Present, and Future, in
PLANT BREEDING: THE ARNEL R. HALLAUER INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 19-26 (Kendall
R. Lamkey & Michael Lee eds., 2006) (detailing a discussion, largely authored by Monsan-
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3. Patent Pooling
A patent-pooling structure is another step back in commitment
and coordination from consolidation and joint ventures. It involves a
licensing entity that administers several pieces of patent property in
order to provide broad access to a number of companies.137 Companies can usually access the protected information for licensed purposes in exchange for the payment of a set royalty.138 The strategy of
pooling is explicitly a response to patent holdups.139 Once formed, patent pools induce wide participation as they present a level playing
ground for all manufacturers (which is also a barrier to a patent
pool’s initial formation by companies desiring to exploit an intellectual property advantage).
Pooling arrangements are more common in high technology electronics; however, there are examples of agricultural pools. One such
pool that has received a great deal of attention is the pool for the genetic material necessary to produce Golden Rice.140 Another is the
Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), a collaboration of universities and nonprofit institutions in several companies to make a variety of biotech innovations available.141
Patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations between
knowing competitors.142 However, it may be possible to compel parties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the
industry.143 They are strongly linked to standards for obvious reato employees, and describing the immense success of Roundup Ready products,
especially soybeans).
137. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123, 129 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2001); Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134.
138. Merges, supra note 137, at 123, 129.
139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 64 (2007)
[hereinafter FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT] (“Patents pools also help to mitigate the ‘hold up’ and
‘hold out’ problems that can sometimes stymie industry efforts to make a product that conforms to an industry standard.”); Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134.
140. David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and
Management Structures 30-31 (Knowledge Ecology Int’l (KEI) Research Note 2007:6,
2007), available at www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf.
141. Id. at 32-33.
142. See Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134.
143. See Alan Cohen, Patent Pools’ Big Splash, IP L. & BUS., Feb. 16, 2005,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1108389913560 (“Pools can be structured to fix prices, stifle competition, discourage innovation, or divide markets. Yet increasingly, going it
alone is a luxury companies just don’t have.”); IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of Intellectual Property – The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to
Essential Medical Technologies (Knowledge Ecology Int’l (KEI) Research Note 2007:3,
2007), available at www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65
(asserting that a 1917 aircraft manufacturers patent pool was essentially compelled
“against the backdrop of legislation threatening to compulsory license the patents”).
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sons.144 Manufacturers may set out to identify relevant intellectual
property and either purchase it for the pool or invite the owners to
get involved. This coordinated effort may have the effect of cutting
short the plans of a prospective patent troll.
As with consolidation and joint ventures, patent pools can avoid
antitrust scrutiny under many circumstances.145 The government
may weigh in on the legality of the pool, although it is not required,
as in the case of an outright merger of assets.146 Most important is
that pooled patents not consist of pure substitutes such that the pool
necessarily represents a reduction in competition.147 More generally,
the pool must have procompetitive effects and not stand as a barrier
to research and development.148 When a patent pool is clearly ameliorating the effects of a patent thicket, the procompetitive case is relatively easy to make.149
4. Standard Setting
When firms perceive efficiency in adopting the same technological
standard, a group effort—usually through an industry standardsetting organization (SSO)150—may develop to sort out the
attributes.151 Unlike patent pooling, this group effort can take place
before intellectual property rights in an area have been perfected. In
many respects, standard setting can be viewed as the antithesis of
patent pooling in that the effort may be directed specifically to avoid
existing and future intellectual property152 (though a standard may
incorporate a pool).153 Often, technology parameters are chosen specifically because they are not subject to patent rights.154 In this manner, a standard can transform the intellectual property environment
144. Merges, supra note 137, at 151 (“Even where there is no formal requirement along
these lines, past practice exerts a powerful influence: having seen standards coalesce into
pools, consumer electronics companies may simply expect this as the natural progression.”).
145. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134-35 (discussing the Department of Justice’s
pronouncements on two permitted patent pools for DVD and MPEG technology).
146. See Clayton Act § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (providing the Hart-Scott-Rodino requirement for the filing of a notification of an intent to merge with the FTC and DOJ).
147. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 74-77.
148. Id. at 67.
149. See generally Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in
Convergent Technologies, 1093 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 180 (2006) (arguing that the presence of a thicket weighs heavily in favor of permitting a particular patent pool).
150. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 33-34.
151. Id. at 33.
152. See Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154-55 (“[I]f a patent owner shows up
in the standard-setting process after the irreversible investment is made, the investments
have been made not just by one manufacturer but by everyone in the industry.”).
153. Merges, supra note 137, at 151.
154. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 41. However, it is often difficult to
avoid patent rights, as they may not be evident when the standard is being set. Lemley,
Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154.
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by conferring or eliminating the market value that is the source of
the asset’s power.
In the agricultural biotechnology field, one finds standards primarily in safety and field-of-use guidelines. Prominent examples exist in the context of the push for organic farming and labeling for genetically modified crops. A regulatory structure for the former was
imposed in 2002 under the National Organic Program, administered
by the USDA.155 However, the latter is subject to industry determinations of when labeling is appropriate.
It is possible to engage in de facto standard setting through the effects of network economics. A particular product may become viable
only if it is integrated into a larger infrastructure, and the integration of one product may preclude the introduction of another.156 This
is a well-established issue in the context of biofuels. Some fuel
sources would require significant changes in traditional aspects of refueling infrastructure157 or automobile manufacturing158 to receive
widespread adoption. Changes to support such fuels may prejudice
the adoption of others that might require an alternative design in
vehicles or services. The voluntary industry adoption of one
design over another has essentially the same effect as an agreed
upon standard.
C. Conditions for Effective Private Ordering
Given the existence of so many useful and legal methods of private ordering, why is it that some industries seem to be unable to organize in this manner? For example, it is well known that computerrelated industries consider the threat from patent “trolls” and other
forms of unproductive litigation to be so severe that they actually desire weaker patent rights.159 Clearly, private ordering has not occurred to the extent desired160 (though there have been some large
scale attempts),161 and there is the belief that some technological ad-

155. 7 C.F.R. § 205.100 (2008).
156. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 60, at 523.
157. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (GAO), BIOFUELS: DOE LACKS A
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COORDINATE INCREASING PRODUCTION WITH INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT AND VEHICLE NEEDS (2007).
158. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
159. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1829-32 (2007) (suggesting conditions, which are
more common in computer-related industries, that permit patent trolls to wreak havoc).
160. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN THE
BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES, Report No. RL33367, at 9-10 (2006), available at
http://fas.org/sgp//crs/misc/RL33367.pdf (“In addition, ownership of these patents may well
be fractured among hundreds or thousands of different individuals and firms.”).
161. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 831-32 (2008) (describing the distribution of free
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vancement has been held up.162 On the other hand, the pharmaceutical industry has generally been able to organize and consolidate in a
manner that maximizes the benefits of intellectual property protection.163 This is not to say that substantial litigation does not exist in
consolidated industries, but rather that the participants generally
believe that intellectual property rights do not create a barrier to innovation and are necessary research and development incentives.
It is possible that the likelihood of private ordering is an immutable characteristic of particular industries. Only if the industry structure and the nature of the technology in question are favorable can
private ordering occur. Otherwise, it will be nearly impossible for
private actors to rearrange ownership rights in such a manner as to
produce an efficient system for innovation. A student of law and economics will see this as an issue of transaction costs,164 and indeed it
is to a great extent. In essence, barriers to negotiation prevent the efficient ordering of rights through licensing and sales. It is therefore
useful to consider the specific conditions that promote ordering.
A basic knowledge of patent transactions, industry structure, and
essential technology allows one to intuit private ordering conditions
with relative ease. The primary factors are first and foremost tied to
technology, but they also depend on general industry practices. Notably, these factors clearly distinguish those technologies in which patent thickets are believed to pose the greatest problem.
1. Limited Number of Patents
In order for consolidation of patent assets to be a reasonable option, a firm or consortium of firms must have the ability to get a
grasp on which patents might impact a particular technological embodiment. It is common sense that one can assess the value and necessity of purchasing patent rights only if one has some idea of the
patent universe. But in many circumstances, assessing a patent universe can actually be quite difficult. If related rights can come from

software as a means of avoiding the problems of diffused property rights); Don Clark, WiMAX Patent Pool Is Planned, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2008, at B6.
162. SCHACHT, supra note 160, at 10 (“In industries where innovation is sequential and
complementary, as with software and computers, some experts argue that strong patents
interfere with the innovation process.”).
163. See Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 693 (2006) (“Large
biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma) do not face the
same threat that their info-tech counterparts face. This lack of cohesiveness has likely delayed or prevented the passage of some of the proposed patent reforms.”).
164. See, e.g., Garadin et al., supra note 118, at 154 (“Industry participants have
tended to view rights dispersion in the single digits as concentrated and thus not problematic, primarily because transaction costs typically do not prohibit bilateral negotiations
when a limited number of firms are involved.”).
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a practically unlimited number of sources directed at a tremendous
variety of different product attributes, then even a diligent researcher may find it impossible to discover all potential infringements.165
Additionally, the danger increases every day with the issuance of
new patents. Therefore, for private ordering to be a reasonable possibility, the number of patents per product must be limited.
The pharmaceutical industry is often cited as an example of a
field in which the number of patents covering a product is limited.166
Although the industry is far from a one-patent, one-product model, it
is certainly not unusual for the number of patents that impact a particular good to be in the single digits.167 If one wished to license or
purchase the rights to a given drug, it would be relatively easy to figure out which patents are involved. Moreover, it is quite likely that
one company would own most (if not all) such patents, making the
transaction significantly easier. On the other hand, in the computerrelated fields, the number of patents that can read on aspects of a
product could be in the hundreds, or even thousands.168 Even a single
piece of software installed on a computing device could be covered by
dozens of patents. This makes comprehensive licensing difficult.
Even technology licensed through patent pools offers no guarantee
that infringement will be conclusively avoided.169
Another consideration may be the number of patents that tend to
populate the entire technology space. Patent environments can be
said to have a “density” that is formed by the web of interconnected
patents.170 Where there is a great deal of invention related to several
popular technologies, the space quickly becomes denser. The density
may, in and of itself, make it more difficult to ascertain the existence
of patent rights and lead to product development that blindly trespasses on the rights of others. For this reason, it is fair to suggest
that less dense patent environments favor private ordering.

165. See Sterk, supra note 85, at 1298-99.
166. See Thomas, supra note 163, at 730 (“Biotech/pharma’s . . . business model
is based on selling products to end users that embody one or a very limited number
of patents . . . .”).
167. For example, some posit that in the pharmaceutical industry, “generally, one patent covers one drug.” Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 150. That is an exaggeration,
but the number of patents is often in the single or low double digits. See Daniel R. Cahoy,
Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 632 n.26 (2005).
168. Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 151 (“In IT, however, one product regularly
involves the combination of 50, 100, even 1000, or—as Intel lawyers themselves say with
respect to their own core microprocessor—5000 different patent rights.”).
169. See, e.g., Olga Kharif, The Currents in an RFID Pool, BUS. WK., Aug. 10, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2005/tc20050810_7703_tc024.htm
(quoting an industry member who states that there is no guarantee that all essential patent holders will participate in the RFID pool).
170. Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 149, at 180.
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As suggested earlier, there are reasons to believe that secondgeneration biofuels will be more like pharmaceuticals than like computer-related technologies. The patent space does not appear to be
huge,171 and the nature of the technology—methods and materials for
producing a single chemical compound for use as a fuel—would be
less likely to read on multiple patents. One could predict that biofuels will meet the first criteria for private ordering.
2. Significant R&D Barriers to Entry
Another aspect that tends to make a patent environment more inclined toward order is the existence of significant research and development costs for relevant innovation. If a company must invest a
great deal in basic materials, research expertise, or time to an invention, smaller players will tend to be kept at bay.172 By virtue of the
smaller field, it is easier for ordering companies to devise an efficient
strategy. A smaller field also reduces the chances that new players
will simply pop up to claim ownership over an aspect of a product or
process that another company is commercializing.173 It should be relatively easy to identify almost all of the potential entrants. Moreover,
significant research and development barriers may mean that even
large, well-funded companies will be reluctant to begin parallel programs rather than purchase or license those already in existence.
Each of the three major segments of biofuel research is likely to
have a significant barrier to entry, but not necessarily for the same
reasons. The design and production of both enzymes and ethanologens is, for the most part, a typical biotechnology research cost barrier. To some extent, enzymes and ethanologens may operate synergistically such that a company that has an expertise in one is likely
to have a great advantage in the other.174 For example, a particular
171. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The relatively broad search uncovered
only about 200 patents since 1988.
172. Cf. Long, supra note 90, at 45 (“The cost of much innovation in software today is
relatively low when compared with the cost required by other industries, which means that
independent inventors do not need the resources of large firms to invent products
or processes.”).
173. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1952-53 (2002) (noting that patents in industries like pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and chemistry are harder to obtain and less likely to result
in holdups).
174. See Anthony Crooks, From Grass to Gas: On the Road to Energy Independence,
How Soon Will Cellulosic Ethanol Be a Factor?, USDA RURAL DEV., Sep. 2006,
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/sep06/grass.htm; Ron Kotrba, Incubation Through Integration, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG., Mar. 2006, http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articleprint.jsp?article_id=1881 (discussing Broin’s attempt to integrate research that impacts
various stages of the ethanol production process); Dep’t of Energy (DOE), Biomass Program:
Past
Solicitations,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/printable_versions/
past_solicitations.html (last visited June 1, 2009) (indicating that Verenium is developing
both enzymes and ethanologens).
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enzyme may produce a type of sugar that is optimally converted to
fuel by a certain microorganism. Coordinating these efforts has obvious advantages.
Biofuel plant technology can share many of the R&D attributes of
enzymes and ethanologens, at least in the context of genetic modifications. But an additional issue is the time it takes to grow plant varieties in test plots. Many companies ameliorate these concerns by
testing in climates that allow at least three growing cycles per
year.175 Compared to the extremely short doubling times for bacterial
populations,176 this is still quite lengthy. The time ends up being a
significant additional barrier to the cost of materials and research
expertise, effectively putting some plant technologies out of reach for
all but the most established firms.
3. Existence of Complementing/Synergistic Infrastructure and
Technology
One of the main reasons a company might choose to purchase or
license another’s technology is the existence of synergies. This is particularly true when that technology may impact part of a product or
service that depends on the continued use of existing technologies for
success. A new product attribute tacked onto an existing distribution
network is an example of such synergy. It has been demonstrated in
the context of the pharmaceutical industry that this is one of the
most important factors underlying mergers.177 Of course, buyouts of
unrelated technologies undoubtedly occur to accomplish goals such as
gaining a foothold in an emerging market.178 But the potential for
synergy acts at least as an accelerant, making it an important factor
in whether private ordering will occur.
As previously stated, biofuel technology is not developed to the extent that one can conclusively determine what aspects truly exhibit
synergy. However, the potential certainly exists. One can presume
that natural connections between enzymes and ethanologens as described above could be important. Technology synergies may be more
likely to occur when firms in established areas such as ethanol production or fuel transport have the opportunity to combine with firms
that are on the cutting edge of a new line of research, like cellulosic
175. Conversation with Tom Richard, Assoc. Professor, Dep’t of Agric. and Biological
Eng’g, Pa. State Univ. (Jul. 8, 2008).
176. ARTHUR KOCH, BACTERIAL GROWTH AND FORM 35 (2001) (“[S]ome bacteria under
favorable conditions can double every 15 min.”).
177. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 307, 319 (2007) (noting that one
company’s excess capacity due to patent expiration or other product sales declines is highly
correlated with mergers).
178. See Ward, supra note 109, at 517.
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conversion. And in plant sciences, a company’s technology for high
yields through insect and herbicide resistance179 would strongly complement another’s technology for facilitating the conversion from cellulose to fuel. More to the point, synergistic alliances are already occurring. Verenium, one of the more prominent biofuel companies, is a
merger between the enzyme company Diversa and cellulosic ethanol
processing company Celunol.180 This creates at least a reasonable
presumption that there is a sufficient amount of synergy and
complementing technology to support ordering of the firms’ respective technologies.
4. Long-Term Market for Technology
A final important factor in facilitating ordering is the likelihood
that licensed or purchased technology will remain useful long enough
to justify the investment in consolidation. In fast-moving fields,
where technologies may become obsolete in a matter of two or three
years,181 making the effort to survey the field and engineer complex
mergers may not make much sense. However, if such consolidations
are likely to lead to research collaborations that pay off for decades,
the effort is clearly supported.
The length of the market is impacted by consumer preference, obviously, but it is also influenced by a number of other factors that are
not as subject to whim. Lengthy product development times may
make it less likely that truly game-changing technologies stand
ready to overtake the market in a short time period.182 To the extent
that the marketing of a technology entails the use of a standard
agreed upon by many industry players, it is unlikely to change from
year to year.183 In addition, the presence of switching costs may delay
or forestall the emergence of alternative technologies.184
In this matter, there is no great question on biofuels. The very fact
that major breakthroughs are not predicted to occur for years into
179. For example, Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready® herbicide resistance technology, see
supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text, would provide significant advantages in the
production of plants with other biofuel-related genetic modifications.
180. Martin LaMonica, Biofuels Firms Diversa, Celunol Merge, CNETNEWS.COM, Feb.
12,
2007,
http://news.cnet.com/Biofuels-firms-Diversa,-Celunol-merge/2100-11746_36158486.html; Press Release, Verenium, Diversa and Celunol Complete Merger to Create
Verenium Corporation, a Leader in the Emerging Biofuels Industry (June 20, 2007), available at http://www.biotech.ufl.org/news/Celunol_DiversaBecomeVerenium21Jun07.pdf.
181. Cahoy, supra note 39, at 612 n.98 (describing the diminished value in patents
when short product life cycles characterize the market).
182. For example, consider the fact that pharmaceutical product development times
may extend to a decade or more. Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 192-93 (1999)
(providing a “New Medicines Timeline” that depicts lengthy product development times).
183. Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154-55.
184. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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the future185 suggests that this is a technology segment with very
lengthy development times. Analogies to general agricultural biotechnology support this presumption. In addition, the cost of pilot
plants, not to mention full-scale production facilities,186 means that it
is unlikely that new technologies will emerge as market competitors
in a short period of time. It is a well-supported notion that whatever
second-generation biofuel technologies emerge as dominant will not
change substantially over the short run.
D. The Danger of Horizontal Consolidation
To this point, it has been useful to consider consolidation in a positive light. The ability to navigate conflicting intellectual property
rights addresses the initial concern of innovation holdup. However,
consolidation can have a negative side. If the concentration of rights
leads to a state wherein competition is suppressed or eliminated, the
pathway to innovation that was anticipated to be cleared could in
fact be shunted off course.
The negative form of concentration is what one might call “horizontal” consolidation.187 Under this model, one company purchases
intellectual property that covers competing products (or even the
company owning competing property). Rather than marketing both
products, efficiency generally dictates that the company eliminates
one. Note that this is a different situation than a purchase to create
synergies; it involves an acquisition that is primarily directed at a
market competitor. Theoretically, this kind of consolidation can be
positive when there is a need to coalesce around a single technology
or standard for some efficiency reason, which could even have a competition-enhancing function.188 But that would appear to be the exception rather than the rule, and it is particularly rare when the field
is still emerging. More commonly, horizontal consolidation eliminates
competing products to provide a single firm with a greater potential
to profit.
Obviously, horizontal consolidation raises antitrust issues in the
same manner that horizontal mergers do.189 Regulators may challenge such asset purchases under some circumstances.190 However, if

185. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
186. EIA, Biofuels, supra note 30 (“Capital costs for a first-of-a-kind cellulosic ethanol
plant with a capacity of 50 million gallon[s] per year are estimated by one leading producer
to be $375 million (2005 dollars) . . . , as compared with $67 million for a corn-based plant
of similar size . . . .”).
187. See Ward, supra note 109, at 512-13 (discussing antitrust issues in
horizontal combinations).
188. Id. at 513.
189. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8-10.
190. Id. at 31.
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the purchase does not result in a significant concentration of market
power, it is unlikely to be challenged.191 For example, if the firms involved control a relatively small percentage of the market and the
consolidated property will not change the equation at the time of the
acquisition, it will generally not violate antitrust laws.192 Significantly, the future potential of the property is the reason that this analysis may fall short. The fact that a consolidation of patent rights does
not result in an immediate increase in market power does not speak
to the possible loss in future innovation. The elimination of a vigorous competitor may prevent the research, development, and commercialization that would otherwise have built a stronger technology. It
may even result in the elimination of any commercialization, as the
purchasing company may have an alternative, less advanced product
line that can be developed at a lower cost.
In the context of biofuels, the horizontal consolidation issue is particularly ripe. With the unknown potential of second-generation enzyme, plant, or ethanologen technology, it is entirely possible that
several different solutions will arise to the same problems. Robust
competition and a reasonably fair public vetting is the optimal way of
determining which technologies are truly the best. But if good alternatives are instead purchased and buried, innovation may be severely compromised.
IV. INTEGRATING PRIVATE ORDERING EFFECTS INTO ENERGY POLICY
If one assumes that the conditions for private intellectual property
ordering exist in the second-generation biofuel technology arena (or
in any nascent technology field, for that matter), it is reasonable to
draft public policy in response. Ignoring the impacts of patent rights
appears to be the current policy,193 and it goes without saying that
this is ill-advised considering the increasing influence of patents. On
the other hand, blindly drafting technology policy from a general understanding of patents is no better given the great differences that
can exist in patent environments between technology fields. In doing
so, one would likely cause more harm than good. An assessment of
the actual patent landscape for biofuels is essential. But to be truly
useful and effective, it must model the changes likely to take place in
the future. Facilitating private ordering with an eye toward eliminating market failures and permitting private industry to align rationally is the overarching goal. In addition, it is important to apply

191. Id.
192. See FTC/DOJ 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at 26.
193. See STEVE SUPPAN, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, PATENTS: TAKEN FOR
GRANTED IN PLANS FOR GLOBAL BIOFUELS MARKET (2007), http://www.iatp.org/iatp/
publications.cfm?refid=100449.
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a forward-looking policy beyond the question of innovation to address
the broader supposed benefits and harms of this particular
energy alternative.
A. Avoiding Innovation Holdups Through Disclosure
To a great extent, the function of private ordering suggests a
largely laissez-faire approach. A structure that provides the greatest
support for innovation, while minimizing the problems of holdouts on
the one hand and horizontal consolidation on the other, is the obvious goal. The best way to achieve this is not a heavy-handed, forced
pooling policy or greater antitrust scrutiny. It is information.
As suggested above, when the conditions are appropriate for private ordering, rational companies should bargain to allocate and license rights effectively.194 However, one barrier to efficient bargaining is the market failure that comes from an information asymmetry.195 In this case, the fact that a patent applicant or owner knows
that the claimed invention covers a particular biofuel technology, but
the commercial entity does not, creates an obvious obstacle to efficient coordination. In fact, it is the classic holdout problem that gives
rise to patent trolls. Significantly, this can occur even in the midst of
a consolidated industry (though it should be far less common).
A goal of biofuel innovation policy should be to eliminate the last
vestiges of holdouts by increasing the disclosure of information. This
should ideally be an ex ante mechanism, which would allow impacted
companies to fully assess the patent environment before pursuing an
invention. Essentially, it would involve compelling prospective patentees to stand up and declare the relevance of their inventions to biofuel technology. Although it would be impossible to simply impose
such a disclosure requirement on the private market, it might be
possible to facilitate it through federal incentives. Alternative energy
is one of the more subsidized industrial segments, and it has great
power over the agricultural industry;196 perhaps these subsidies—
whether tax credits or research grants—could be used as a carrot to
promote such desired behavior.
There is precedent for a federal program that compels intellectual
property ownership disclosure in exchange for a benefit. In the
pharmaceutical context, companies that submit a new drug application (NDA) must affirmatively disclose to the Food and Drug Admin-

194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
195. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 47 (4th ed. 2004) (“[S]evere
asymmetries can disrupt markets so much that a social optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange.”).
196. See Doug Cameron, Agribusiness Group Forms to Protect Ethanol Subsidies, WALL
ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A3.
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istration patents that cover the drug.197 A list of the relevant patents
for each drug is contained in a publication (now in electronic form)
known colloquially as the “Orange Book.”198 A failure to disclose a patent does not result in unenforceability, but there are consequences.
Namely, a NDA owner will lose the ability to delay a generic competitor’s approval through the Hatch-Waxman scheme,199 a right that is
potentially worth millions of dollars per day.200 While this is not entirely analogous to the kinds of incentives in place for biofuels, it is
nonetheless a demonstration that a federal disclosure system
is possible.
Alternatively, the rise of standard-setting organizations or patent
pools in biofuels may provide the opportunity to encourage disclosure
as a condition for access. Since the recent stir caused by the Rambus
company’s ability to surreptitiously own patents covering a standard
it helped promote through an industry organization,201 standardsetting organizations will likely be much more cautious in requiring
intellectual property disclosure. This private model will serve the
same purpose in many instances as a compelled government regulation.
B. Social Policy Beyond Innovation Policy
Biofuels will provide an opportunity for rural development so long
as the primary benefits accrue to farmers and forest landowners, to
small businesses that might stimulate job growth, and to rural communities to the extent that an influx of money will enhance the rural
service sector. However, with the control of biofuels realigning to
large agribusinesses through the consolidation of intellectual property, there may be a shortfall in the expected benefits. The initial positive of increased agricultural commodity prices202 may be outweighed
by problems created by increasingly constrained (i.e., less competitive) markets and limitations in dispersing ethanol production. In
197. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (c)(2) (2000).
198. See FDA, Electronic Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last
visited June 1, 2009).
199. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3).
200. See David Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 332 (2000) (quoting 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,882-83 (1999)) (describing how delaying generic entry can “mean tens of millions of dollars in increased revenue for an innovator firm”).
201. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the
FTC failed to demonstrate that Rambus’s behavior was anticompetitive).
202. For example, a report authored for the USDA describes the emergence of the biofuel economy as a rural development opportunity based on an increase in agricultural
commodity prices. DANIEL G. DE LA TORRE UGARTE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
BIOENERGY CROP PRODUCTION ON U.S. AGRICULTURE 19-20 (2003), available at
http://www.usda.gov/oce/reports/energy/AER816Bi.pdf.
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the end, consolidation may actually result in a net negative for rural
development. That fact must be acknowledged, and the entire development angle to biofuels must be rethought.
According to economic theory, markets need to be competitive to
maximize efficiencies and to fairly distribute benefits and harms.
However, in the agrifood system, it has long been the case that profit
margins are so narrow that horizontal integration is necessary in order to justify investment in research and development. If companies
such as Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta had not succeeded in consolidating the seed industry,203 then the capacity to accumulate profit
from the agricultural production process may have been constrained,
and the investments in agricultural biotechnology research and development would have been lower. Although this necessary ordering
has produced social benefits beyond innovation in the form of the expanded use of more benign herbicides and fewer pesticide applications, the formation of oligopolistic agricultural markets has had
negative impacts as well.
It has been suggested that the flow of agricultural production
benefits to small farmers is diminished by industry consolidation.
William Heffernan, for example, argues that farmers have a diminished decisionmaking capacity in the increasingly concentrated
field, meaning that fewer are needed every year.204 Essentially, the
traditional family farmer is being replaced by the large agribusiness,
and the food system is becoming just like other segments of the economy.205 Heffernan believes that intellectual property plays a role in
this due to its tendency to reduce competition in the food system.206
By extension, consolidation of intellectual property interests in biofuel may have the same effects as in general agriculture.
One of the best examples of how powerful intellectual property
rights can impact the interests of farmers concerns Monsanto’s patents on Roundup-Ready® seeds. Monsanto (and similarly situated
companies) have a great interest in protecting the innovation embodied in each seed.207 In the case of Roundup®, this is a genetic modification that makes the plant resistant to the herbicide,208 permitting
203. See KING, supra note 109, at 9-11.
204. William D. Heffernan, Biotechnology and Mature Capitalism 2-3 (June 1999),
available at http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/biotech.pdf.
205. Id. at 8-9.
206. Id.
207. See William Boyd, Wonderful Potencies? Deep Structure and the Problem of Monopoly in Agricultural Biotechnology, in ENGINEERING TROUBLE: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 24, 28 (Rachel A. Schurman & Dennis Doyle Takahashi Kelso eds, 2003). See
generally Juan Enriquez, Technology, Gene Research, and National Competitiveness, in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE RURAL ENVIRONMENT 225 (Otto T. Solbrig et al. eds., 2001).
208. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: 1942–2000, at 244 (2d ed. 2005).
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more precise weed control. Protecting this technology is not easy, as
every single seed is a copy machine that can duplicate the modification and allow a farmer to avoid purchasing more seed the next year.
In order to protect its interests, Monsanto uses a “bag tag” (also
known as a “seed wrap”209) license that prevents farmers from saving
seed in subsequent years.210 To date, Monsanto has been successful in
enforcing its license against individual farmers.211 In doing so, arguably, it has eliminated the tradition of seed saving and changed the
relationship between farmers and seed companies.212
Similar to the agrifood system, the biomass that will serve as the
raw material supply for the biofuel industry will likely be supplied by
hundreds of thousands of agricultural and forestry landowners. At
least some policymakers seem to assume that as a result of the
emerging biofuel sector, some of the same landowners supplying the
raw materials for the agrifood system will have increased demand for
their raw material outputs.213 That increased demand will lead to
higher prices for the farm outputs.214 However, this assumption ignores the fact that farm producers purchase inputs and sell commodities in oligopolistic markets. Because of the limited competition in
agricultural commodity purchasing and processing, farmers have little bargaining power. Since farmers will be marketing their biomass
in a similar marketplace as the current agricultural commodity system, it is unlikely that economic benefits accruing to farmers
will continue.
Experts also contend that to maximize environmental and economic benefits, biofuel processing facilities should be geographically
diffuse and locally owned.215 Due to the bulkiness of the biomass
209. The title is an obvious homage to the shrink-wrap licenses from the software field.
See Daniel R. Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage? Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of Contractual Recapture of Patent and Copyright Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135, 152
(2003) (describing the “shrink-wrap” terminology).
210. See Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects Farmers to Suits over Patent, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at A18.
211. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co.
v. McFarling (McFarling II), 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
212. See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 253-57, 259 (2003); Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How
Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1917-18 (2007).
213. See DE LA TORRE UGARTE ET AL., supra note 202, at 19-20.
214. See, e.g., 25X’25, ACTION PLAN: CHARTING AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE 5-6 (2007),
available
at
http://www.25x25.org/storage/25x25/documents/IP%20Documents/
Action_Plan/actionplan_64pg_11-11-07.pdf (claiming that the biofuel economy component
of the plan to supply twenty-five percent of the nation’s energy needs by 2025 will increase
farm income by $180 billion and create 4 to 5 million new jobs).
215. David Swenson & Liesl Eathington, Determining the Regional Economic Values of
Ethanol Production in Iowa Considering Different Levels of Local Investment 25-28 (BioEconomy Working Group, Iowa State University, 2006), http://www.valuechains.org/
bewg/Documents/eth_full0706.pdf; see also Alissa L. Meyer, Farming Fuels: Searching for
Rural Revitalization in an Agricultural Bioeconomy (2008) (doctoral dissertation on file
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feedstocks, energy efficiencies would be lost during the transportation to distant processing facilities. Ideally, then, biomass would be
processed into fuel closer to the areas where the biomass is harvested. Furthermore, the economic benefits in the form of job creation and profit distribution are enhanced when those diffuse production facilities are locally owned.216
Oligopoly in the biofuel sector would not necessarily prevent the
development of diffuse processing facilities. The major biofuel companies could develop a franchising system for production similar to
that of petroleum distribution outlets. However, such a franchising
system is not equivalent to local ownership. Furthermore, the dominance of the biofuel markets would most likely serve as a barrier
to small companies with otherwise promising approaches to producing biofuels. New entrepreneurial efforts would fail not necessarily
because they are less efficient, but because they will be seeking to
enter a market that is not competitive. Since it is unlikely that the
biofuel processing facilities will be locally owned, the economic benefits will be limited.
Policymakers need to consider difficult tradeoffs to achieve both
environmental and economic benefits from the biofuel economy.
The current context of private ordering of biofuel intellectual property may enhance environmental benefits at the expense of
economic benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Although biofuel policy is currently undergoing great scrutiny, policymakers have devoted insufficient attention to the relevant intellectual property environment. Given the fact that the future of this
important technology resides in cutting edge research and development advances, it is very reasonable to assume that patents will play
an important role. An overview of the current patent ownership
landscape suggests that it is diverse and fractioned. Following the
theories of Heller, Eisenberg, and others, one might be concerned
that an anticommons is in the works, jeopardizing the future viability of biofuels. However, using agricultural biotechnology as a guiding
heuristic, it is predictable that such an anticommons will not occur.
The pattern of consolidation that has characterized agricultural biotechnology since the 1990s seems poised to reoccur. In articulating
the framework and conditions for consolidation, this Article demonstrates that an anticommons will likely be avoided by private ordering of intellectual property rights. An optimal intellectual property
with authors) (summarizing arguments that biofuel processing facilities should be geographically dispersed).
216. Swenson & Eathington, supra note 215, at 25-28.
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policy will take this into account and foster the private market while
ameliorating market failures that may permit some patent thickets
to germinate. In addition, the broader impacts of consolidation will
need to be considered in order to ensure that the interests of stakeholders beyond industry are not unduly compromised. The consequences of ignoring the impacts of private ordering in energy innovation are great. The potential for years of misdirected energy investment creates a critical need for such enhanced analysis.

